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Abstract Research on the emerging links between the Middle East (West Asia) and
other parts of Asia has grown considerably since late twentieth century. Indeed, the
contributions to this special edition of the journal reflect some of the pioneering work
taking place on pan-Asian relations encompassing new analysis of the Middle East’s
links with the ‘East’—Central, South, and East Asia. The research in this field, looking
back into history as well as forward, has grown in response to the changing dynamics
of intra-Asian relations following the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the collapse of
the Soviet Union as a Eurasian land empire just a year later. The end of bipolarity
encouraged new transnational relations and further regionalization of a new world
order. As multi-polarity has steadily given way to a state of non-polarity, so the veil
has also been lifted on the significant economic and political ties which have grown
across strategic regions. In considering strategic regions, it is contended here that Asia
is home to the most dynamic of these, in terms of asset accumulation, geopolitical
weight, population size, and economic prowess. But it is also significant for the
volatility which appears along the fault lines of historical animosity, national security
tensions, modern-day rivalries, border and resources disputes, and the strengthening of
communalism and divisive role of identity politics. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet
control of much of Central Asia opened up new spaces for exchange in Asia, much
encouraged by the exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves of the Soviet successor states in
Asia (also Azerbaijan in the Caucasus). But, pan-Asian ties predate the post-Cold War
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transformations of the global system, and several Asian powers were able to negotiate
mutually beneficial links soon after the Second World War. Although evidence of
ancient pan-Asian relations is to be found in the Silk Road, systemic shift in our time is
clearly leading to a perceptible transfer of the global economic balance Eastwards,
which has brought with it the rise of energy-hungry Asian economies in the twenty-first
century. Asian demand for energy has changed the complexion of Middle East-Asia
relations, and pan-Asian relations in this context are today a reflection of the changing
contours of the global political economy.
Keywords Regionalization . Pan-Asian relations .West Asia . MENA subsystem .
Energy
Introduction
The discussion in this volume reflects the many interesting debates which have been
taking place in Durham and elsewhere1 since the mid-2000s on how inter-Asian, pan-
Asian, relations are being shaped and indeed being mediated.2 Scholarship has grown
considerably on this emerging relationship—this emerging ‘nexus’ [11]—and is in-
creasingly reflecting the diverse perspectives of the many parties involved [21]. When
considered in terms of trade and investment partnerships, political and security links,
and also cultural and social relationships, evidence points to a broadening and deep-
ening of pan-Asian exchanges [18]. The underlying thesis of this paper, then, is that
while there is a steady global Eastward shift of industry and economic dynamism, the
most dramatic and often neglected aspect of this global shift is its impact on global
regions. One such region which has been directly affected by systemic shift is the
Middle East and North Africa region, specifically the ‘West Asia’ part of it [6].3 It is
also argued that the end of the Cold War removed the barrier to regionalization [12].
Indeed, arguably, regions since the end of the Cold War have come to underpin the
globalization of the international system [22].
Secondly, rapid industrialization of China and India has increased the propensity for
Asianization as it has raised the demand for hydrocarbons from the emerging Asian
economies—just as it was flattening in Europe and North America. Asia, as will be
shown below, has become the key market for hydrocarbon exports. Thirdly, as higher
oil prices facilitated a faster rate of capital accumulation in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) oil-exporting countries, so they, particularly the richest Gulf
1 The Gulf Research Center has actively followed the trends since 2006, the annual Gulf Research Meeting in
Cambridge (UK) has had a standing workshop on Asia-Gulf relations since 2010, and the Washington-based
Middle East Institute launched a vibrant Middle East-Asia Project in 2012.
2 Our first international workshop on ‘The Emerging East Asia-Middle East Nexus’ in 2009 was followed a
major conference in Durham on ‘The Historical Legacy of Asianization’ (February 2013). We then held a joint
conference with the Middle East Technical University in Ankara on ‘The Asianization of the Middle East’
(June 2013), an international conference in Durham in April 2014 with Kuwait University on ‘Pan-Asian
Relations and the Middle East’, and since June 2014 have been developing a joint project on China and the
Middle East with Nottingham University’s School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, and a further research
partnership on the ‘New Silk Road’ with the Abu Dhabi-based Center for East Asian Studies and Research.
3 West Asia also maps nicely onto the Persian Gulf subregion of the MENA subsystem. The Persian Gulf in
turn exemplifies the most globalized and economically dynamic part of the MENA region.
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Cooperation Council (GCC) countries with accumulated surpluses and sovereign
wealth funds exceeding $1.7 trillion, 4 have raised their volume of imports from
industrializing Asia and are also increasing their investments in the emerging Asian
economies. As a result, both sides are building networks and from these networks are
arguably emerging shared visions, if not interests.
Fourthly, although the transition from bipolarity to unipolarity in the 1990s enabled
the USA to pursue its national interest with little concern about a backlash—China and
India were still ‘emerging’, Japan was already a close Asian ally, Russia was weak and
in apparent decline, and Europe was engrossed in continental rebuilding—regional
powers responded in different ways to the US unipolar moment: some drew closer still
to the USA and bandwagoned with it, while others choose to stand apart and distance
themselves from the remaining superpower. In the latter case, such regional actors were
then either coopted (Libya, Vietnam) or were isolated (Iran, Iraq, Sudan). The bombing
of targets in Iraq and Sudan was a consequence of this, as was the isolation of Iran in
the ‘dual containment’ belt the USA put around both Iran and Iraq in the 1990s. But the
US ‘new world order’ proved to be short-lived, and the unipolarity of the 1990s swiftly
gave way to a multi-polar structure in the 2000s in which the USA had to contend with
the voice of an expanded European Union in international fora and the concerns of the
emerging Asian and Latin American powers. The sense of concern following its
defence strategy of the ‘war on terror’, which not only argued for US intervention in
other countries but also justified the extrajudicial extraction of suspects from third
countries, was compounded by the devastating war in Iraq in 2003, which effectively
changed the Middle East regional balance of power. Additionally, the depletion of US
treasure (to the tune of $1 trillion) and the resistance to its unilaterality did much to
expose it to pressure, while facilitating the resurrection of regional and major powers.
By the mid-2000s, Russia appeared to be standing on its own two diplomatic and
security feet, and China and India were already making diplomatic inroads in regions—
Africa and Latin America in the case of China [14] and the Middle East and Central
Asia in the case of India [5]—hitherto inaccessible to them. The transition from multi-
polarity to non-polarity, however, was quicker still, and following the 2008 financial
crisis, during which the Atlantic economies lost much ground to the emerging econo-
mies, they found themselves vulnerable to the policies of altogether new actors, the
most prominent of which was the BRICS. 5 I believe that regional actors, and the
international system more broadly, are still coming to terms with the realities of a non-
polar world in which no one power can dictate terms of engagement. On the one hand,
global non-polarity provided the conditions for the birth of such partnerships as the
BRICS, but on the other hand, non-polarity also piqued the interest of counter-
hegemonic powers. The few such regional powers, with resources or geopolitical
advantage, stepped up their interventions in their respective regions in an effort to
shape their neighbourhood to their own interests. Counter-hegemons, thus, have tended
to act where the USA has had a greater interest, as in the Middle East and East Asia.
Regional powers more generally have done the same, and ironically, the USA has had
to step up its regional interventions precisely because other powers have come to
challenge its role and influence. Thus, while it has tried to assume a ‘pivot’ to East Asia
4 Latest data from http://www.bqdoha.com/
5 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
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and build closer links with India and its other Asian allies, it at the same time has had to
service its alliance structures in the Middle East (showing a strong presence in West
Asia and reinforcing its security commitment to its traditional allies), and also remain-
ing fully engaged with the multiple crises of the MENA subsystem. Non-polarity has
raised the US regional profile and not diminished it.
So, what are the drivers of the growing interdependence, so-called complex inter-
dependence,6 between the edges of the Asian continent and the broader implications of
this new Asian ‘convergence’ for the structure of the international system? Its drivers, I
would suggest, are, firstly, systemic shift, which is encouraging convergence; secondly,
the restructuring of international relations in a world of regions; and thirdly, reinforcing
trade compatibility (hydrocarbons for East and South Asia in exchange for required
goods and services) providing fuel for the convergence. What this means for the
broader workings of the international system is harder to judge, but what it does show
of the international system is that globalization is increasingly Asianization of the
international system in which the relative balance of power has changed sufficiently to
cause an Eastward shift. Furthermore, as systemic shift is changing the hierarchy of the
international system, it is also placing greater emphasis on the role and regional
importance of emerging Asian powers. In this, it is deepening the regionalization of
Asia.
Regions and Asian Realities
With the vertical and horizontal growth of the European Union, as an exemplar of
regional integration; the rapid globalization of production chains and means of ex-
change; and of course the consolidation of regionalist trends in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, regionalism as a rich field of enquiry has grown in importance and relevance
over the last 20 years [12, 22]. Efforts at conceptualizing (state-led and state-orchestrat-
ed) regionalism have provided many insightful reflections on how, where, and why
regional integration may have accelerated in recent decades [13]. Within this discussion,
we also see broader reflections on other forces at play, namely the process of globali-
zation7 and with it that of regionalization,8 as the dominant forces changing and shaping
international relations. If conceived as a system, however, then the fact remains that
globalization generates structural problems associated with its uneven spread and as
such inevitably encourages further vertical stratification of the international system.
Where countries are in this vertically stratified international system is increasingly
determined by the regional institutions and structures surrounding them, and
6 This concept provided the analytical basis of the discussion in Ehteshami and Miyagi [11].
7 As the concept of globalization has a mixed disciplinary heritage, no single definition can encompass its
complexity of meaning, and certainly, dispute continues to rage over it being considered a process [7] or new
system [23]—whether it is the endgame or a stepping stone. There is consensus however that it challenges the
state system and its place as the only and the one dominant form of cross-border exchange, and in this sense, I
will conceive of globalization in this article as a three-pronged phenomenon, which shortens distance and
squeezes space, stretches human activity (economic, political, and social) beyond national frontiers, and
deepens and increases the density of global interaction (interconnectedness).
8 Hurrell has defined this as ‘the growth of societal integration within a region and… the often undirected
processes of social and economic interaction’ ([16], p. 39). In my case, I include both state and commercial
actors as regionalizers.
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regionalism can arguably break down the territorial barriers to integration [20]. Thus, the
strengthening of regionalism could turn it into ‘a building block of an intrusive world
order [and] new forms of regional identity built around intrusive regionalism’ and
ultimately an ‘important stepping stone to a post-Westphalian world order’ ([1], p. 30).
But regionalism provides only some protection, as we have seen in the case of the
vulnerable Eurozone countries in the EU, and even such ‘tight regions’ do not fully
shield their members from the vagaries of global upheavals. However, in the absence of
tight regionalism, it is in fact informal networks (‘loose regionalization’) which can best
characterize cross-region interactions and perhaps this is nowhere more evident than in
the emerging pan-Asian networks. By way of comparisons, pan-Asian networks are
weaker than regional-based groupings: so, the ASEAN Forum, for example, is more
formalized than any East Asia-West Asia network. Indeed, even the emerging inter-
continental networks, namely the 12-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the
EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), offer a more structured
dialogue than any inter-Asian equivalent. The closest to an Asian forum is the six-
member Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has identified such regional
powers as Iran, India, and Pakistan (and also Mongolia) as eligible for membership. If
the SCO does grow to 10 members, then Russia would be its only ‘European’ member
and together the 10 countries will account for 20 % of the world’s GDP (at current
prices), 43 % of the world’s population, and over 25 % of its natural gas reserves (the
fuel of choice in the coming years).
The second point to make is that while regionalization theory informs the conceptual
framework of this analysis, pan-Asianization as a feature of Asian regionalization
remains patchy and uneven: in reality, only some MENA states are ‘Asianizing’, and
by the same token, it has been the more sophisticated Asian economies which have
deepened their Middle East (West Asian) networks. So, regionalization—mirroring
globalization—is neither an even nor a uniform process. But to make matters more
complex, even the idea of Asia remains contested; at best, Asia is an amalgam of
diverse countries and of unequal and uneven powers, and of contested histories.
Regionalism, though prevalent, is fractured in Asia. In Asia, regions can usefully be
divided into two distinct realms: Pacific Asia and South and Central Asia. The former,
encompassing East Asia, has complex roots in post-War distribution of power between
key East Asian countries and can itself be divided into two dynamic subregions of
Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.
South and Central Asia, on the other hand, are relative new comers to regionalism.
South Asia was firmly a piece of the global competition between the two superpowers
but has also had a micro-cold war of its own fuelled by intense hostility between India
and Pakistan. Thus, regionalism in South Asia only began to take shape in the 1980s,
and it was not until 1985 that the eight-member South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) was born.9 Central Asia of course was firmly under Soviet
control and West Asia was in large part pro-Western.10 Central Asia is now cocooned in
the regional bodies of SCO and ECO.
9 With 21 % of the world’s population and an economy increasingly rivalling that of China and Japan,
SAARC has begun to realize the value of closer cooperation as Asian economies have expanded.
10 Iraq veered towards the Soviet Union after the revolution that overthrew its monarchy in 1958, and Iran’s
Islamist revolutionaries adopted a policy of ‘neither East nor West’ after the overthrow of the monarchy in that
country in 1979.
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For much of the twentieth century, Asian regions were subject to superpower
pressures, and despite efforts of some, such as the subregional organization of ASEA
N, to break free of geopolitical pressures, regional relations remained hostage to great
power politics. Indeed, the character of the dominant outside power’s presence, the
USA, in Pacific Asia is defined by the post-War security conditions of the region. US
troops remain on Japanese and Korean soil and protect Taiwan, military forces exercise
with almost all 10 ASEAN countries, and the US Seventh Fleet (with 60+ surface
vessels and nuclear submarines, 300 aircraft, and 40,000 troops) patrols the Yellow,
South China, and East China seas; the Sea of Japan; the Malacca Strait; as well as the
Indian Ocean.
Asia, therefore, is a penetrated region. It is also a continent of unequal and
competing powers and a cauldron of unresolved grievances. It is beset by the Sino-
Japanese rivalry, Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme, and rising Sino-US mar-
itime tensions, all of which are adding to the region’s insecurity and also to the
militarization of an already militarized region.11
The Middle East and North Africa regional system is equally dynamic but even more
volatile. The MENA region is beset by conflict; wars between Arab states and non-state
actors and Israel have been a feature of the region for decades, and three inter-state wars
in the Persian Gulf since 1980 have done much to shape inter-state relations of this
strategically important subregion. Furthermore, revolutions, uprisings, and coup d’états
have shaped the domestic form of states since the 1950s [4]. Yet, here are located some
of the oldest regional organizations of the modern period: the 10-member Economic
Cooperation Organization (successor to the three-member Regional Cooperation for
Development founded in 1964) is the largest non-Arab Muslim regional body in the
world, and the League of Arab States (AL), established in 1945with just six members, is
perhaps the best known of MENA’s regional organizations, but the chequered history of
this 22-member body tells the story of the MENA subsystem’s dysfunctionality and
structural tensions. The League’s inability to stamp its own authority on the regional
system, regularize MENA inter-state relations, create a common platform for the
protection of the interests of its members, advance development, or act as a fully fledged
regional organization at the global level underlines the instability of the MENA region.
Arab states have gone to war against each other, disowned and undermined each other in
public fora, and as a consequence torn at the pillars around which the League could have
built a central axis for the Arab states in the regional system.12 Inter-state competition as
a key feature of the MENA regional system has partly been to blame for this state of
affairs, compounded as it has been by external intervention. But since the 1990s, it has
been state implosion which has shaken the regional system [8]. Since 2011 in particular,
11 North Korea’s nuclear programme and its belligerence unsettle its southern neighbour and also Japan, and
China’s military assertiveness since 2010 partly explains the heightened sense of insecurity in East Asia, which
is not helped by rising defence budgets. China’s defence budget since the early 2000s has grown 30 times and
stood at $132 billion in 2014, up 12.2 % on 2013, which is enabling the PLA to modernize and compete more
effectively with the forces of its neighbours; Japan’s 2015 military budget is the country’s largest, at a record
$42 billion, and will enable the Japanese Self-Defence Force to modernize and add a further 30 amphibious
vehicles, six F-35A stealth fighters, and unmanned aircraft to its arsenal (see The Economist, 15 March 2014,
and 19 January 2015).
12 Egypt’s expulsion from the League for its unilateral peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Iraq’s censure for
invading neighbouring Kuwait in 1990, and Syrian regime expulsion from the League in 2012 serve as
examples of inter-Arab conflicts.
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several Arab regimes—Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen—have lost central control of their
territories and become victims of powerful non-state Islamist actors; Egypt, the geopo-
litical and cultural cornerstone of the Arab order, has been weakened by years of internal
turmoil; and smaller Bahrain, Jordan, and Tunisia have been subject to much domestic
upheaval. In this chaos, formerly strong states have been reduced to rubble and some
small states have become influential regional actors. In this regional system, power
remains fluid and is no longer defined by the traditional measures (of territory, popula-
tion, or size of armed forces). Thus, the United Arab Emirates (with just 1.2 million
Emiratis) has acquired more penetrative power than Egypt (with 82 million).13 Also,
legitimacy is heavily contested within and across Arab state boundaries. Furthermore,
the region’s powerful actors—Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—are divided
amongst themselves and are pursuing maximalist aims often at the expense of each
other and the wider regional order. MENA is a regional order defined by anarchy and
profound chaos.
So, neither region—whether East Asia or West Asia—is particularly stable, and
despite the regions’ respective economic strengths, both remain subject to external
power pressures and also inter-state internal rivalries. South and Central Asia, on the
other hand, have acquired established—through still competing—power relations,
which do not necessarily make these regions more conducive to pan-regionalization
but at least make them less prone to open hostility. The nuclear stand-off between India
and Pakistan is a major feature of the South Asia subregion, and mutual assured
destruction does keep the parties in conversation and alerts Islamabad and New Delhi
to keep the level of rivalry to manageable dimensions. Central Asian states, in the
meanwhile, are building links with both China and India without alienating Moscow, in
the expectation of Asian demand for their hydrocarbons will spur a closer partnership
between them and the global economies of this century.
The pivot of Asianization today is China [15], but as Japan started all this, it remains
a key actor. Japan’s continuing heavy economic weight, its close security relations with
the USA (and also growing links with India and South Korea), and its military
expansions have raised its standing in intra-Asian relations. Japan remains a key partner
of the MENA oil exporters and is a keen exporter of goods and technological services
to them. Of course, India plays a major role in the forging of pan-Asian relations and
particularly those between the Gulf states and the subcontinent, given its historic
relations with the Gulf states. The legacy of its historic ties with West Asia and the
prosperity of the expatriate Indians living in the oil-rich Gulf Arab have tended to act as
magnets for India. Pakistan too has close links with the Gulf Arab states and not only
provides labour for these capital-rich countries but also assists several of them mili-
tarily. The natural bond between these subregions is being enhanced by the growing
economic links between the Gulf states and the subcontinent.
Energy Drives Relations
History in the Middle East in the twentieth century was a by-product of Western
intervention, a colonial legacy that not only shaped the regional state system but
13 The UAE’s GDP is $390 billion and Egypt’s is around $272 billion.
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also determined the rise and demise of the Middle East’s regime types and
political elites. For the post-War period the region’s abundant hydrocarbon re-
sources and its proximity to the Soviet Union ensured a permanent Western
presence in the region, which the USA came to champion from the 1950s. Thus,
with the exception of Japan (which joined the ranks of the West’s major oil-
importing countries in the 1960s and by the 1980s was accounting for over 7 % of
world oil consumption) and South Korea in Asia, until the 1980s, much of the
region’s oil output was destined for the industrialized countries of Europe and the
USA. Thus, in the 1970s, the USA alone was taking some 40 % of its oil imports
from the Persian Gulf (West Asia) (Table 1).
Rising demand from emerging economies of China and India, in particular, began to
change the picture, given that South Korea’s (RoK) consumption plateaued in the
1990s. As Table 2 shows, combined oil consumption of China and India in 1998 was
barely greater than that of Japan’s, but just a decade later, the two Asian giants were
consuming nearly three times more oil than Japan and China’s demand alone was
outstripping that of Europe’s largest economies. To put these figures in a broader
context, China’s energy profile changed dramatically in the mid-1990s from being a
net exporter to a net importer of petroleum, which today has made China the world’s
second largest consumer of oil. Indeed, BP has estimated that China will be the main
source of oil consumption growth in the world in the coming decade, to overtake the
USA as the world’s greatest consumer of oil with 17.5 million barrels per day
consumed by 2030.14
Petroleum consumption of India, Japan, and South Korea completes the Asian
energy map, which between them consumed over 10 million barrels of oil per day
(mb/d) in 2012. Adding this figure to that of China’s, then these four Asian economies
make up the world’s largest group of consumers, accounting for over 20 million barrels
of global output, well exceeding the EU’s total of 12.8 mb/d. What this translates into is
that as much as half of the Middle East’s oil output is now heading to these four
countries and also some 70 % of the region’s natural gas output is being consumed by
Table 1 World oil consumption patterns, 1965–1995 (mb/d)
1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1990 1993 1995
China 0.2 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.0 2.3 3.1 3.5
EU6 5.8 7.6 10.0 10.1 10.4 10.7 10.4 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.5
India 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.6
Japan 1.7 2.8 4.3 5.1 5.1 5.0 4.4 4.5 5.3 5.4 5.8
RoK 0.03 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.0
USA 11.5 13.4 15.2 16.6 18.4 17.1 15.2 16.3 17.0 17.2 17.7
USSR 3.3 4.1 5.1 6.6 7.4 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.4 5.8 4.5
Calculated from BP, Statistical Review of World Energy. Various annual editions
EU6 France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and UK
14 http://www.ncac-usaee.org/pdfs/2011_01BP.pdf
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them. Put another way, in 2013, 41 % of China’s oil imports came from West Asia,
63 % of India’s, and as much as 75 % of Japan’s [24].
The growing relationship has meant that 67 % of the GCC’s exports headed to Asia
in 2013, and this group of countries imported 40 % of its needs from Asia.15 In the
10 years following 2007, the GCC’s imports from China doubled and its imports from
India increased by 26 % in the same period [9]. By 2020, China is likely to be this
group of countries’ biggest export market [2] and annual trade between them could
reach $350 billion. Looking at India’s trade with Iran and Saudi Arabia, we can see that
it has grown substantially as well in the 2000s: from $3.4 billion with Saudi Arabia and
$1.6 billion with Iran in 2005 (a total of $5.0 billion), it grew to $34.5 billion in just
5 years. In the case of South Korea, trade with the region is probably even more
significant, with three Middle East states appearing on its list of top 10 importers in
2010.
Yet, this is at best a slowly maturing relationship when set against China’s trade links
with its more immediate neighbours: its trade with ASEAN in 2012, for example, was a
staggering $400 billion and is expected to reach $1 trillion a year by 2020 [17], far
outweighing the trade with West Asia.
Iran and Iraq are not far behind their GCC counterparts: 56 % of Iran’s trade is now
with China alone and 77 % of its total exports in 2013 went to just four Asian countries:
China, India, South Korea, and Japan. Crucially, the same four Asian countries met
50 % of Iran’s total imports.16 Until the 1990s, it should be noted, it was the EU which
dominated Iran’s trade. In the case of Iraq, whose economy has been a victim of war
and sanctions since the 1980s, 70 % of its exports today go to the same four Asian
countries and it receives one quarter of its imports from them. So, when compared with
the rest of the region, it is clear that the oil-rich Persian Gulf subregion, the GCC as the
most dynamic economies of the Arab world in particular, is in fact the most ‘Asianized’
part of the MENA subsystem. They do all look Eastwards. Their success in building
15 http://vision.ae/en/articles/gcc_asian_economic_ties_set_to_soar (accessed January 2015)
16 Observatory of Economic Complexity, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/irn/ (accessed January
2015). Equally significantly, non-oil trade between Iran and China reached $13 billion in 2013.
Table 2 World oil consumption patterns, 1998–2012 (mb/d)
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
China 4.4 4.9 5.5 7.0 10.1 10.1 9.8 10.7
EU6 9.9 10.9 10.8 10.9 10.8 10.0 9.7 8.3
India 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.7
Japan 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.7
RoK 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5
Russia 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.4
USA 18.9 19.7 19.8 20.1 21.0 19.5 19.2 18.5
Calculated from BP, Statistical Review of World Energy. Various annual editions
EU6 France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and UK
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closer links with South and East Asia, however, underlines the uneven nature of MENA
Asianization and the limits of pan-Asian development.
Europe’s energy-saving drive since late twentieth century and America’s extraordi-
nary success in extracting oil through fracking in the twenty first have led to noticeable
reductions in the Euroatlantic bloc’s oil imports from the Middle East, which has
coincided with dramatic rises in demand from the emerging Asian economies. The
growing dependence of Asian economies on Middle East oil has changed the balance
of petroleum demand in the twenty-first century. What is evident is that the oil
exporters have begun responding to the changing global energy market and are
focusing their energies on South and East Asia, and in this, the ‘security of their future
oil and gas exports will become more and more dependent on their energy relations
with China and other East Asian countries’ ([24], p. 15).
Given the historical weight of Western involvement in West Asia, however, it is
unlikely that the West will part from its interests in this strategic and hydrocarbon-rich
part of the world anytime soon, and is also as unlikely that the region’s West-leaning
countries will cease their close security ties with the USA and its European allies. But,
arguably, the contours of the regional powers’ relationship with the West have changed,
and in one critical instance, at least the attention of the Middle East has shifted
Eastwards, and that is in terms of their economic development. As was put by the
secretary general of Saudi Arabia’s Committee for International Trade, Omar Bahlaiwa,
‘We are in a Catholic marriage with America [divorce is unthinkable]. But we are also
Muslims – we can have more than one wife’.17
There is, however, a growing depth and intensity to intra-Asian economic relations,
where investment and also trade are increasingly inter-Asian, and West Asian countries
are major contributors to this transformational process as suppliers of energy, relatively
large markets, and of course capital. The energy-rich countries of the Middle East
certainly grease the wheels of Asianization. Beyond energy, the key components of
these relationships are oil-related and infrastructural investments, non-petroleum trade,
security ties (where China and increasingly India are partners of choice), defence
partnerships, and cultural and educational ties [10]. So, the building of new refineries
in East Asia is being financed by the oil-rich states, and East Asian corporations in turn
are winning major oil exploration projects and infrastructural, construction, transport,
and even power-generating contracts in West Asia: Japanese and South Korean corpo-
rations have led in these fields since the 1970s and remain strong (as with South
Korea’s $22 billion award in 2009 to build four nuclear power plants in the UAE), but
China is now a major player in development projects in the Middle East. Starting with
the construction of Tehran’s underground system in the 1990s, Chinese firms have
stolen the march on their Asian competitors by winning contracts for the building of
railroads in the GCC countries as well as pushing ahead with Israel’s strategically
important Eilat-Ashdod rail freight link project which could compete with the Suez
Canal as an alternative transit route between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. It
is similarly involved in developing infrastructural, assembly plants and energy-related
projects in North Africa, particularly in Egypt and Algeria. China’s efforts to build
west-east energy infrastructural networks, pipelines from Russia and West and Central
17 Hassan M. Fattah, Hu’s Saudi Visit Signals a Change in the Gulf, International Herald Tribune, 24 April
2004.
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Asia to China, are also helping to consolidate pan-Asian strategic links and places
China at the heart of Eurasian economic networks. The Chinese-sponsored road,
maritime, and rail ‘silk roads’ are promising to reweave the cloth of Asian trade routes,
and other East Asian countries stand to gain from such massive initiatives.
Beyond the linkages which drive the geographical edges of Asia closer together, it is
also clear that there is uneven ‘Easternization’ and the data gathered suggests that the
Persian Gulf subregion has emerged as the most Asianized part of the MENA subsys-
tem [18]. The relationships which have emerged are a product of modern industriali-
zation and a consequence of modern trade patterns being dictated by the energy-hungry
economies of India and East Asia. In this, the Persian Gulf greases the wheels of global
industry which is increasingly located in Asia. A critical reading of the concentration of
economic power in the East also will suggest that power is unevenly divided across
Asia and highly contested.
Convergence of Interests vs Convenience of Relations
It was suggested earlier that the increasingly strategic relationship between the edges of
Asia is a product of loose regionalization being forged by the changes in the hydro-
carbon market (the strategic export commodities of West Asia and the strategic import
commodities of South and East Asia). Loose regionalization is nevertheless generating
important pan-Asian networks and, as already noted, increasing investment, infrastruc-
tural, and energy tie-ups. But, do the Middle East oil exporters have a plan B for
declines in Asian growth rates affecting their hydrocarbon imports? Do they really have
options in a world where European and American demand remains flat and they need to
compete with Russia and others for market share? The simple answer is no, and for that
reason, the oil producers are keen to broaden the base of their partnerships in Asia and
diversify them away from oil. In this strategy, Asian countries are willing partners, and
to facilitate these pan-regional relations, several formal fora have also been established,
such as the Japan-GCC Free Trade Agreement, the China-Arab States Cooperation
Forum, the Indo-GCC Business Forum, the GCC-China Economic Forum, and the
Kuala Lumpur-based GCC-ASEAN Economic Centre. These fora help to manage the
flow of traffic between Asian regions and the Middle East and also advance the
emerging networks.
Despite these networks and increases in the frequency of diplomatic exchanges,
travel, flights, and passenger numbers, and Asian leaders’ talk of building strategic
partnerships with their Middle East counterparts, in reality, what we have deepens
economic and commercial links without politics. Clearly, the South and East Asian
states’ strategy is designed to avoid the dangers of being embroiled in the MENA
region’s intractable security and political problems, to avoid the securitized American
route of engagement with the region, but as their embrace strengthens and Asian
powers appear to rise on the ladder of global prominence, so the Middle East regimes
increasingly look at their ‘strategic’ partners in Asia to act in consort with their growing
‘understanding’. In practice, the South and East Asian side of the equation would rather
avoid facing in public or private the tough choices in advancing the Arab-Israeli peace
process, confronting Jihadists, committing resource to tackling security problems of
various regimes, or helping create a nuclear weapons-free zone which would require
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Israel to declare its weapons programme and Iran to abandon many aspects of its, but
the growing Asian interdependencies mean that Asian powers can no longer avoid the
crises of the MENA region or continue to expect the USA to address them. The
strategic vulnerabilities are huge and are getting more complex.
Strategic Vulnerabilities
Complex interdependence is the prism through which the thickening of Middle East-
East/South Asia links has been analysed here, but the same also provides the basis for a
better understanding of the enhanced dangers of cross-regional insecurity contamina-
tion. Strategically speaking, the Middle East marks the geopolitical middle of the
transition from West to East and as such is a significant space for the remaining West
and the emerging East. East Asia’s energy dependence on West Asia is perhaps the
most profound aspect of the former’s strategic vulnerabilities. As we saw in 1979, when
Iranian oil exports left Japan short, in 1990s when the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil
exports affected the Asian importers and in 2003 when the US invasion of Iraq took
Iraq out of the oil market for nearly a decade, the Asian economies are incredibly
vulnerable to the domestic changes and regional tensions arising in the Middle East. All
the Asian hydrocarbon consumers also face another problem, arising from their
exposure to Western/US interventions in the Middle East. Despite its apparent weak-
ness in dealing with the region’s multiple crises effectively, the USA remains the
dominant external actor in the MENA region whose actions do have a direct impact
on the energy security of Asian importers. In 2003, US military action severed Asian
access to Iraq’s oil, and in 2011, US-led sanctions on Iran raised the premium on their
commercial dealings with Iran, and while Japan and South Korea—under US pres-
sure—suffered by loosening their ties, China and India did the opposite and banked on
Iran’s economic isolation to extract easier access to its oil as well as its market.
Added to the dangers of turmoil fromWest Asia disrupting Asian convergence is the
less than benign strategic landscape of East Asia itself [3]. Crises in Northeast Asia,
over North Korea’s belligerence towards the South and Japan and Japanese-Chinese
border disputes and naval presence, Taiwan, all have the potential to erupt into open
conflict which would certainly suck into the theatre the USA but would also become a
hazard for West Asian countries which have profitable trade links with several of these
countries and no political influence to note. The dangers of losing trade (and income)
will be magnified to a real security crisis if the USAwere to intervene on behalf of its
East Asian allies and seek the isolation of China.
In East Asia, the fear of an assertive China, ‘peaceful rise with teeth’, has generated
complex responses—from Southeast Asian countries bandwagoning with the USA to
the creation of an India-Japan-led Asian ‘democracy axis’ to tighten the Tokyo-New
Delhi-Seoul triangle for the purpose of balancing against China’s southward and
westward. Also, it should be noted, the policies of Asia’s giants themselves towards
their West Asian counterparts have broad implications. Thus, China’s close ties with
Pakistan, including close military ties and extending to giving Chinese navy maritime
access to ports on the Arabian Sea, have resulted in India drawing closer to Iran since
the early 2000s. This would be consistent with the analysis that if India regards
‘China’s support for Pakistan, as well as its encroachment into the Indian Ocean… as
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part of a coherent strategy to encircle India and confine its influence to South Asia’
([19], p. 116), then it would react by forging strategic links with the neighbouring
regional powers. It has done so with great success in Southeast Asia but has also begun
to do so in West Asia. So, following President Khatami’s visit in January 2003, India
pushed to create a military bond with Iran, despite Tehran’s close military links with
China, and agreed to provide training for the Iranian armed forces, maintain and
upgrade Iran’s Russian-supplied armour (its fleet of MiG-29 fighters, T-72 main battle
tanks, and armoured carriers), conduct joint naval exercises, and generally assist in the
maintenance of Iran’s armed forces, for which it claimed the strategic prize of access to
Iranian territory. Iran’s agreement, as part of this accord, to allow Indian forces to train
on its soil was perceived in Pakistan as Tehran in effect consenting to Indian encircle-
ment of Pakistan.18 In Israel, itself a military partner of India, the accord was criticized
for giving Iran (the ‘epicentre of international terrorism’ in their view) access to new
military technologies which it would use against Israel’s interests. Though this was
never the intention of the Iran-India military accord, it is easy to see how it can be
misperceived and misunderstood by competing powers. Israeli nervousness of course
alerted the USA to the potential dangers of Iran-India military cooperation which
resulted in American pressure on New Delhi to limit its ties with Iran in return for a
closer partnership with the USA. So, it is self-evident how such relationships can leave
the West Asian region open to new types of pressure, arising from the power dynamics
of South Asia and also the dynamics of relations between India and China as conti-
nental Asian powers of this century. India and China compete for influence in West
Asian countries, but as this is a dialectical process, so their competition echoes in the
region in which both have a direct strategic interest. But in pursuit of their energy
interests, they also find themselves exposed to competitive forces at play in the Middle
East.
For the MENA countries, which have grown weary of (Western) intervention and ill-
advised policies in the region, Asian countries appear to provide safe havens of
diplomacy. Asian giants do not assume to intervene or pass judgement on the internal
affairs of their MENA counterparts, and for a country like China, which purports to
uphold the doctrine of non-intervention, this position can be an advantageous diplo-
matic pawn. But for the MENA countries which have become dependent on Western
(US) protection, or for those who are attempting to balance against the USA (Iran,
Syria), non-intervention can very easily translate into non-interest. China and India, as
Asia’s political powers, will have to tread carefully in this respect. The easy passage of
UN-imposed intrusive sanctions on Iran has shown that Beijing may not have the
firmness to veto what could have been interpreted as Western interference in the
internal affairs of a close economic partner; India’s vote at the UN in support of
sanctions brought stinging criticism from Tehran; China’s eleventh hour intervention
in support of Muammar Qaddafi in the dying days of his regime was badly received
across the Arab world; and China’s opposition to the isolation of the violent Assad
regime in Syria has appeared to much of the Arab world as China not be the best judge
of regional relations.
18 Asia Program (2004). The Strategic Partnership between India and Iran. Asia Program Special Report, No.
120, April. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
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In the context of strategic interdependence, one fear is that the chaos of the MENA
subsystem could potentially spill over into Asian theatres and thus threaten the national
security of several Asian countries at once. Of particular concern in countries with
Muslim minorities, namely China, India, the Philippines, is the radicalization of their
Muslim populations, the evidence for which is to be found in the periodic terror
campaigns besetting these countries. Equally worrying for South and East Asia is the
rise of militancy in the Southeast Asian Muslim countries, a growth in sympathies for
local Salafi Islamist groups, or worse still a tide of support for Al-Qaeda or ISIS in their
midst. Developments in the Middle East can act as a conveyor belt for radicalization in
Southeast Asia. When it comes to building alliances with West Asia, the constellation
of relations is so competitive that building strategic/security ties becomes truly hazard-
ous. Thus, both India and China have faced grave difficulties in adjusting their policies
to the highly competitive nature of Iranian-Saudi Arabian relations, and in favouring
one, each had had to make concessions to the other. Even less fortunate have been
Japan and South Korea who have found it impossible to pick a winner in the ongoing
power struggle between Tehran and Riyadh, and have had to opt for the Saudi side so
as not to incur the wrath of the USA.
Conclusion
What has been argued is that shift in the balance of economic power, alongside a
structural shift in the global energy market, has been driving the Asianization of the
Middle East and, as an energy-led process, will also augment the deepening of pan-
Asian relationships to increasingly include Central Asia. But Asianization is not
synonymous with de-Westernization. The USA and its European allies have many
other interests in the Middle East besides energy, and it is therefore unlikely to sever
their long-standing relationships with their Arab allies, or indeed Israel. However, as
Israel itself becomes a player in the energy market, aiming to become an exporter in the
next few years, so its security calculations will likely change too to reflect its new
status. Israel has chosen to stay close to the USA for security protection, but as an oil
producer, it will be tempted by the markets of Asia and may opt to cultivate widening
its security partnerships with such oil- and gas-consuming countries as China, India,
Taiwan, and South Korea in anticipation of serving as a new source of hydrocarbons for
these Asian consumers.
Finally, the much discussed US pivot towards East Asia is first and foremost
contingent on a successful effort to stabilize the Middle East, which ironically can only
happen with the US active engagement. America’s allies—in Europe and in the Middle
East—will therefore not accept a unilateral American disengagement that would leave
them without external support. They will likely do what they can to keep the Western
bloc’s presence strong in what is essentially the European Union’s backyard. So, while
West Asia’s history is increasingly being written with Asian hands, it is still those
powers that shaped the MENA subsystem which still determine what is being written.
Asianization may be, but not, pan-Asian regionalism yet.
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